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File PRR - EEI

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL PERRY:

SUBJECT: National Intelligence Plan.

The following is submitted as a detailed discussion of the contents and procedure for the establishment of a National Intelligence Plan.

I. Definitions

1. Essential Elements of Information. That information of capabilities and intentions of other powers required for the making of sound decisions relating to the national security of the United States.

The EEI are designed

a. To focus attention and activities of all information collecting agencies on that information necessary at a particular time for the making of sound decisions relating to the national security of the United States.

b. To focus attention and activities of all intelligence producing agencies on the production of intelligence necessary at a particular time for the making of such sound decisions.

Responsibility for formulation of EEI rests upon the foreign and military policy makers guided by the chief intelligence officers of the government.

2. Analysis and Indications. The breakdown of essential elements into those factors which must be sought to answer the inquiries posed by the EEI.

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For a plan as broad in operation as that proposed by the CIG it is suggested that the analysis of the EEI would represent a breakdown of the essential element into the particular factor or factors affecting each of the constituent agencies engaged in policy decisions in the government relative to national security and the indications into those particulars relating to each such subdivision of the analysis.

3. Primary Responsibility: Assignment of primary intelligence producing responsibility for each factor derived from the EEI.

This assignment to a particular agency would carry corollary responsibility for the coordination of related information collecting activities.

By such assignment, maximum utilization of personnel and minimum duplication of activity can be achieved.

4. Deadline: Deadline dates where appearing in the Plan should represent the date by which information is to be delivered to the appropriate agency in Washington.

Such agency would be that assigned to the production of any Special Studies established by the Plan.

5. Special Study: Timely, complete intelligence studies on central questions raised by the EEI and the Analysis and Indications.

Assignment of Special Studies would ordinarily follow assignment of Primary Responsibility (above).

Special Studies would be included in the Plan in order to familiarize all agencies with current intelligence production and particularly to alert collecting agencies to the demands to be made upon them. These collecting agencies would thus be required to initiate

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independent action in advance of any request.

6. Strategic Intelligence Digest and Estimate (SIDE): Strategic Intelligence Digest is a digest of the total factual intelligence available within the United States and required for national security on all countries of the world.

Strategic Intelligence Estimate is an estimate of the capabilities and intentions of a country based upon the factual intelligence contained in the Strategic Intelligence Digest.

## II. Procedure.

NIA  
1. EEI. It is suggested that a preliminary EEI be prepared by the CIG for the guidance of constituent agencies. Each such agency should then examine the preliminary EEI and recommend such changes or additions as it believes necessary. These recommendations from constituent agencies should have the approval of their own policy makers prior to resubmission to the CIG, e.g., for the War Department recommended EEI should be those approved by the Chief of Staff; for the Navy Department, those approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Upon receipt of their recommendations the CIG should then reexamine the preliminary EEI and prepare a final statement of the EEI including such of the recommendations as it believes are warranted by existing circumstances. This final EEI should then be forwarded through CIG channels to the Secretaries of State, War and Navy for concurrence ✓ and to the President for his approval.

2. Analysis and Indications. When EEI have been approved, the CIG should prepare preliminary analysis and indications and circulate them to their member agencies for recommendations. Upon return of these

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recommendations, final analysis and indications should be prepared.

3. Primary Responsibility. This third step should be the result of consultation and conference among agencies charged with implementing the Plan. Production of intelligence required by the EEI should be assigned to that agency best qualified for the task. Responsibilities of such agency will be discussed under Implementation below.

4. SIDE. The Essential Elements of Information are limited by definition to that information required at a particular time. The Essential Elements are not all inclusive. To insure the collection of information and the production of intelligence essential for future needs not encompassed within present urgent circumstances, a Strategic Intelligence Digest and Estimate or its equivalent should be incorporated into the Plan. The estimate in addition to furnishing a recurring picture of the situation will also reveal needs for changes in the EEI. The SID will insure the collection of basic factual intelligence required if intelligence agencies are to be flexible enough to meet future crises and have available factual intelligence necessary for any situation.

III. Implementation. For convenience in revising the Plan to meet changing situations the EEI should be sufficiently broad to require minimum change. Good EEI should be able to stand indefinitely. The force obtained by approval of the President supplies a continuing basis for insuring the coordination of all agencies. The assignment of primary responsibility is the first step in implementation.

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The collection of information and the production of intelligence under the plan should be required in the form of projects assigned by the CIG and by maintenance of the SID or its equivalent by each agency. The combination of these should provide satisfaction of all intelligence needs and the actual at hand availability of all intelligence required for national security.

Main responsibility for the production of studies ordinarily would follow the assignment of primary responsibility but should be the result of the cooperative efforts in each case of all agencies.

This cooperative effort should provide for control of production by the assigned agency and free utilization by it of services required from other agencies.

Implementation would be furthered also through the work of such committees as that presently engaged in the "Defense Project."

Implementation is the danger spot which the CIG alone can watch. That agency should continually assess the operations of the plan, the production of studies and compilation of the SID so that it may take corrective action where necessary or recommend changes where desired.

By insuring flexibility in the EEI so that they can remain unchanged for long periods, amendment of the plan can be accomplished with ease by the CIG since all other elements of the plan are formulated by the CIG and require no further approval.

Pitfalls. Following are suggested as difficulties apt to recur in the preparation or revision of the plan.

a. Too many cooks, particularly adoption of a system requiring the approval of too many persons or agencies when revisions other than of

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the EEI are intended. In all cases action outside the CIG should be for recommendations, the CIG reserving the right to approve or disapprove.

b. Inertia. It is for this reason that it is suggested preliminary EEI and analysis and indications be prepared by the CIG. These convenient aids to stimulation do not handicap the more fertile minds in their thinking about the plan. They do help by indicating clearly to all others what is being asked from them.

c. Conservatism. Closely akin to inertia but more difficult to overcome.

d. Prejudice. For example any discussion with A-2 always involves concepts and facts of strategic vulnerability and the importance or lack of importance that A-2 finds being placed upon that concept. Keeping approval within the CIG permits scaling down other agencies' prejudices to an appropriate place in the plan.



1st Lt., AUS

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ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION

- I. What are the capabilities, plans and intentions of the USSR inimical to the national security of the United States?
- II. What are the capabilities, plans and intentions of powers, other than the USSR, acting alone or in concert, inimical to the national security of the United States?
- III. What influences operating within the Western Hemisphere threaten the national security of the United States?
- IV. What internal influences threaten the United States war potential?
- V. What nations are capable of developing important new weapons which will require changes in national policy to insure effective national security?

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